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INTRODUCTION 
In recent papers [9-l l] we have proved existence theorems for deterministic 
differential games. These are games between two players y and x, with 
dynamics given by a system of ordinary differential equations 
-$ = f(4 x, Y, 4, 
and a payoff depending on X, y, z and the time when the game terminates. 
The purpose of the present paper is to obtain such existence theorems for 
games in which the dynamics is given by a system of stochastic differential 
equations 
where o du! represents the “noise”. We shall also consider games with any 
number of players. 
In recent years, Fleming (see [l-3], survey in [4], and joint paper with 
Nisio [5]) has proved existence theorems for stochastic optimal control 
problems. A basic approach here is the reduction of the problem to a setting 
in terms of solutions of the second-order parabolic equations and the use of 
a priori estimates. In the present work we shall combine this approach with 
some ideas developed in [9]-[12] for deterministic games. 
In Section 1, we have collected material on second-order parabolic equations 
and systems in a form suitable for subsequent applications. In Section 2, we 
deal with games of perfect observation. Here the number of players is 
arbitrary. The existence of an equilibrium point in pure strategies is proved. 
In Section 3 we deal with a 2-player game of partial observation and prove the 
existence of value and of a saddle point. 
* This work is partially supported by National Science Foundation Grant NSF 
GP-5.558. 
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The basic underlying assumptions of this paper are: (i) the “noise” 
coefficient (T is independent of the controls, that is, 0 = o(t, x), and (ii) the 
matrix ucr* is positive definite. Some remarks concerning (ii) are given in 
Section 4. 
I. AUXILIARY RESULTS ON PARABOLIC EQUATIONS 
We denote by x a variable point in the euclidean space R”“, and by t a real 
variable. A function f(x) is said to be uniformly Hiilder continuous (with 
exponent a) on a set S CR”” if, for some C > 0,O < 01 < 1, 
If(x) -f(x)1 < C’ x - x y for all x, i in S. 
A functionf(t, X) is said to be uniformly HGlder continuous (with exponent a) 
on a set GC{--co < t < a} x R” if 
I.f(t, .x) --f(t, %)I < C(i t - t iair + j x - %!I). 
The constant C is called a Hijlder coefficient (with respect to the exponent 01). 
Let J2 be a bounded domain in R”, with boundary &2. Suppose a52 can be 
locally represented in the form 
xi = $(x1 ,*..> Xi-l, Xi+1 , %7L), U-1) 
where 4 is in C2. Then we say that aJ2 belongs to C2. If the second derivatives 
of + are uniformly HGlder continuous (exponent 01), then we say that 8s 
belongs to C2+. 
Throughout this paper, QT will denote the cylinder 
Qr =((t,x);~ <t < T,xEQ), 
where s, T are fixed real numbers and !2 is a fixed bounded domain in R”“. 
We also set 
s,. = {(t, x); s < t < T, x E aq, Q, = {(a, x); x E q, 
ag = {tu, 32); x E aq, r, = s,uc&. 
By D, and OS2 we shall mean any partial derivative of the first and second 
orders, respectively, with respect to the components xi of x = (.q ,,.., x,). 
By the gradient vector C,. we mean the vector 
(+A.., Y&f,; 
here, either f = f(z) or f = f(t, x). 
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Let X2 belong to C?. A function @ defined on r, is said to belong to 
C2J(TT) if (a) in terms of the local parameters (as in (l.l)), @, a@/& a@/&, , 
aqaxj ax, for all (j # i, k # ) i are uniformly continuous on ST; (b) @(T, x) 
is in C2(G$), i.e., D,@(T, x), Dz2@(T, x) are uniformly continuous in !2, 
and (c) @ is continuous on X2,, . 
Let 22 belong to C2+a. If @ E C?J(Tr) and if, in addition, the functions 
@, a@/&, @/&cj , a2@/axj ax, occurring in (a) are uniformly Holder con- 
tinuous (exponent a) and @(T, x) E C2+a(J&), then we say that @ belongs to 
c;*yr,>. 
If GE C2J(TT), then we denote by 11 @II;,: an upper bound on all the 
derivatives occurring in (a), (b). If @ E C$‘(T,), then we set 
II @ ll;,;,a = Ii @ iI:,; + H&W, 
where H,(G) is an upper bound on Holder coefficients (with respect to 
exponent CX) of all the derivatives occurring in (a), (b). 
A function Y defined in QT such that Y, DtY, D,Y, Dz2Y are uniformly 
continuous (uniformly Holder continuous, exponent a) in QT is said to belong 
to C2TQ~) (C:?QT)). 
It is well known that @ E C2J(TT) (@ E Ct’l(FT)) if and only if there exists 
a function !P in Cisl(QT) (Ct*l(QT)) such that Y = @ on r, . 
A function U(X) is said to belong to IV,“&?) (1 < p < 00, k non-negative 
integer) if all its weak derivatives of order <k belong to P(sZ). A function 
u(t, x) is said to belong to War if u and its weak derivatives 
Dsu, Dtu, D,% 
belong toD(Q,). We introduce the norm 
II UII W;'l(Qr) = " ' '&"(Qr, 
Consider a partial differential equation 
+ c(4 x)u = f(t, x) in QT, (1.2) 
with initial and boundary conditions given by 
u=@ on rr. (l-3) 
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We shall need the following assumptions: 
(A,). For all (t, x) E& and all 6 E R*, 
j,k=l 
(l-4) 
where +, , vr are positive constants. 
(A,). The ajk(t, > x are continuous in Qr; denote by v a modulus of continuity 
for all these functions. 
(Aa). The derivatives &z&t, x)/&vi are uniformly continuous in Qr; denote 
by us a constant for which 
%kh x1 < v 
C3Xi 
3 for all (t, x) E Qr . 
(Ad). The derivatives &+,(t, x)/at are uniformly continuous in QT; denote 
by v, a constant for which 
aujk@> x) < v 
at ‘4 for all (t, x) EQ~. 
(B). The bj(t, x) and c(t, x) are measurable functions in Qr , and 
I w, 4 < v2 > lc(t,x)l <v2 for all (t, x) EQzT . (1.7) 
Let u be a function in w;l(QT), for some p > 1, continuous in Qr , such 
that (1.2) holds almost everywhere, (au/at, au/&+ , @u/axj ax, are taken as 
weak derivatives) and (1.3) holds. Then we say that u is a solution in @;‘(Qr) 
of (1.2), (1.3). When p = 2, we simply say that u is a solution of (1.2), (1.3). 
LEMMA 1. Let asZ E C2, @ E C2J (T’,), and let (A,), (A,) and(B) hold. Then, 
for any p > 1, f ELP(Q=), there exists a unique solution in w”,‘l(QT) of (1.2), 
(1.3). Furthermore, ;f, also, f ELg(Q=) for some p < q < 00, then u is the 
unique solution in qsl(QT) of (1.2), (1.3), and 
Here C is a constant depending only on v,, , v1 , vz , v, QT . 
This lemma is due to Gagliardo [13, 141 forp = q = 2, and, in the general 
case to Solonnikov [ 19, 201. 
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We write, for any set Q’ in the (t, x)-space, 
where the 1.u.b. is taken with respect to (t, x) E Q’, (t, 5) E Q’, (t, X) + (t, g). 
LEMMA 2. Let ii!J E C2, Cp E C*J(FT), and let (AI)- and (B) hold. 
Then there exists an ~1, 0 < 01 < 1, such that, for any f E Lm(QT), the solution u 
of (1.2), (1.3) satisfies 
I Dzu I or.Q’ < c (1.9) 
for any set Q’ whose closure is contained in Q=; here C is a constant depending 
only on v0 , v1 , v2 , v3, v, QT , Q’ and l.u.b.rT I@ I. 
Proof. The lemma was proved in Ladyzhenskaja-Solonnikov-Uraltseva 
[17, Chap. 61 in case u, D,u, Dz2u, D,u are continuous in QT and j u / < p; C 
depends, in this case, only on v ,, , vt , v2 , vs , v, QT , Q’ and p. Note, however, 
that p is bounded by a constant depending only on the vi and 1.u.b. j @ I. 
To prove the lemma in general (i.e., when u is only in W;l(Qr)), we 
approximate aij , b, , c by sequences of smooth functions a: , bin, c*: 
n aij -+ aij uniformly in QT , 
bin 3 bi in LP(&=) and almost everywhere, 
cp --+ ci in LP(QT) and almost everywhere. 
The quantities vk , v for the a; , bin, c” can be taken to be independent of n; 
they will depend only on the vk , v in (AI)- (B). Hence, the corresponding 
solution un satisfies 
1 Dz@ 1a.Q’ d c> (1.10) 
C as in the assertion of the lemma. Since the un satisfy (by [17; Chap, 61) a 
uniform Holder condition (independently of n), there exists a uniformly 
convergent subsequence {zP’}. Its limit is easily seen to be the solution u of 
(1.2), (1.3). Finally, (1.9) follows from (l.lO), upon taking n = n’-+ co. 
LEMMA 3. Let 0 < a < 1. Suppose &I E C2+, @E Cf*‘(I’T), and let 
(A1)-(A4) and (B) hoZd. Then, for any f E Lm(QT), the solution u of (1.2), (1.3) 
satisjes 
1 D+u Iol,Qr < '?\I @ ll;,;,n + '.up;p. If i), 
where C is a constant depending only on v,, , v1 , v2 , v3 , v4 , v, QT . 
(1.11) 
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Proof. If @ = 0 and bi , ci , f are continuous, then the lemma is due to 
Friedman [6] (see also [7]). By approximation, the assertion follows for 
bi , ci , f measurable and bounded, in case @ = 0. If @ f 0, then we extend 
it into a function 4 defined in the whole (t, x)-space, such that D,&‘, Dz2&, 
D,& are Holder continuous (exponent a) in Qr with coefficients bounded by 
C’l! Q1 II& (C’ depending on Qr). 
Applying the special case of @ = 0 to ii = u - &, we obtain the assertion of 
the lemma. 
Remark. Note that instead of assuming that @ E Cz*r(J’r), it suffices to 
assume that @E CsJ(T’r) and D,@ is uniformly Holder continuous 
(exponent LX) on ST , D,@ being any tangential derivative at aQ. 
We shall deal later on with parabolic systems of the form 
+ fk(t, x, V,ul ,..., VzuN) = 0 in QT , (1.12) 
uk z @” on rT, (1.13) 
where k = 1, 2,..., N and fk are nonlinear in the variables V,uj. We shall write 
24 = (Ul ,..., u,J and say that u E W:l(Qr) if and only if uj E II$*‘(Qr) for allj. 
We also write 
A similar notation will be applied to other norms. 
If u E W;l(Qr), u E C(Qr), D,u E C(Qr) and if (1.12) holds almost every- 
where (with Dz2u, D,u being weak derivatives) and (1.13) holds, then we call 
u a strong solution in w:l(Qr.) of (1.12), (1.13). When p = 2, we simply call u 
a strong solution of (1.12), (1.13). 
2. N-PERSON GAMES WITH PERFECT OBSERVATIONS 
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic theory of stochastic 
differential equations, and its relation to parabolic equations. Expositions 
of these topics can be found in [5, 15, 161. 
Consider a system of m stochastic differential equations 
d4 = f (6 t, ~1 >..., YN) dt + 4, 6) dw (2.1) 
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for s < t < T; here s, T are fixed real numbers, w(t) = (wl(t),..., wm(t)), 
where the wi(t) are independent Brownian motions. We also introduce the 
initial condition 
84 = x0 > (2.2) 
where x0 is a random variable independent of the wi(t). We shall denote by 
7 the exit time from Qr . 
Let UK be compact subsets of some euclidean spaces Pi; we shall call Yi 
the control set for the player yi . When each player yi chooses a pure strategy, 
i.e., a measurable function yi(t, [) d e ne on [s, T] x Rm with values in Y, , fi d 
then the system (2.1) takes the form 
d5 = f(t, E, rdt, O,..., ydt, 0) dt + o(t, 0 dw. (2.3) 
Under some standard assumptions on j, CJ (stated below) the system (2.3), 
(2.2) has a unique solution t(t). 
In addition to (2.1), (2.2), we are given costfunctionals 
li(Y1 ,***9 YN) = Es, 
11 
’ hdt, E, ~1 ,... , yN) dt + gih t(9) j 9 (2.4) 
s 
where E,, (1 stands for the expectation. When the players choose pure strategies 
yj = yj(t, x), if the solution 5 = t(t) is then uniquely determined, then one 
can compute the costs Ji(yl ,..., yN). 
The above setting of the players choosing pure strategies represents a 
model of a game of perfect observation. In this model, the players make use 
only of the present position of X. In the deterministic games considered by 
Friedman [9-121, the players make use also of all the past positions of X. 
This more general setting can also be extended to games with dynamics 
(2.3); we shall introduce it in Section 3. 
Another remark. We assume throughout this work that the “noise” 
term o is independent of the control variables y1 ,..., yN . If u depends on the 
yi , serious mathematical difficulties occur, and very little is known (even 
when N = 1). 
We shall often write y = (yi ,..., yN). If all the yj are pure strategies, we 
call y a pure strategy. 
Suppose now a(t, x) andf(t, x, y) are measurable in t, uniformly Lipschitz 
continuous in (x, y), and bounded by const. (1 + 1 x I). Then, for any pure 
strategy y(t, x), measurable in t and uniformly Lipschitz continuous in X, 
there exists a unique solution t(t) of (2.3), (2.2) (see [15, 161). Actually, with 
a suitable definition of a solution, Stroock and Varadhan [21] proved that a 
unique solution of (2.2), (2.3) exists whenever f(t, x, y, (t, x),..., yN(t, x)) is 
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bounded and measurable, a(t, x) is bounded and continuous, and UU* is 
positive definite (u* = transpose of u). This solution is a continuous Markov 
process of diffusion, with local drift f and local covariance u. Further, setting 
(a,J = * uu* 
and assuming that the random variable x,, = x0(w) is a constant x0 , the cost 
functional Jk turns out to be (see [5]) 
Jk = VU 4 (2.5) 
where & is the solution of 
+ + f a,&, x) .-.c!k 
i,j=l 
axi axj + ff fi(4 2, Yl(C 4 ,..., Y.44 4) 2 i=l z 
+ h,(t, x, rdt, x),..., ydt, 4) = 0 in QT , (2.6) 
(elk =gk On r~. (2.7) 
Suppose (aij) is a positive definite matrix. Then, by Lemma 1, the system 
(2.6), (2.7) has a unique solution I+& under some assumptions on u, f and 
the yi (t, x). It will be much more convenient to work with (2.5), (2.6), (2.7), 
instead of (2.1), (2.2), (2.4). We shall therefore define the concepts of a 
game and equilibrium point with respect to (2.5), (2.6), (2.7); analogous 
definitions can be given, however, with respect to (2.1), (2.2), (2.4) also. 
We shall assume in what follows that u is such that (aii) satisfies (A,), (A,) 
and, at times, (Aa), (A4). Regarding f (t, x, y) and the hi , gi , we shall assume: 
(0 f (t, x, yi ,**-, yN) and the hi(t, X, yi ,..., yN) are continuous in functions 
in [s, T] x R” x YI x ..’ x YN, aQ E C2, and the g,(t, X) belong to 
cyr,). 
Then, to any pure strategies yj(t, x) (1 < j < N) there corresponds a cost 
vector 
J = (Jl , J2 >..., Jzv), where Jk = yh(s, -4, 
and each $k is the unique solution of (2.6), (2.7), in accordance with Lemma 1. 
DEFINITIONS. The system (2.5), (2.6), (2.7) is called an N-person differential 
game with perfect observation. Consider the following scheme (or function): 
Each player chooses a pure strategy, and then the costs J% are computed. We 
refer to this scheme as a game of perfect observation played by pure strategies, 
or, briefly (following Fleming [l] for N = 1) a Markovian game. 
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DEFINITION. A pure strategy 
y”(t, x> = (Yl*(t, x),..., YN*(t, 4) 
is called an equilibrium point in pure strategies (or an equilibrium pure strategy) 
of the differential game if 
Jk(Yl*,... , y& , yr 9 YZ+1 ,..., YN*) 2 Jk(Yl*Y..> Yk*-1 > Yk*P Y;c*+1 P-*-Y N*) 
(2.8) 
for any pure strategy yk , 1 < k < N. 
An equilibrium point is a “reasonable” solution for noncooperative game 
of N players. If N = 2 and J1 + Jz = 0, we say that we have a zero sum 
2-person game; the equilibrium point is then called a saddle point in pure 
strategies. 
We shall prove in this section that an equilibrium pure strategy y*(t, x) 
exists. y*(t, x) is also an equilibrium pure strategy for the game determined by 
(2.1), (2.2), (2.3); th e concept of a solution of (2.2), (2.3) is taken as in [21]. 
Letp, (k = 1, 2,..., N) be a variable point in R”, and consider the function 
Hk(4 x, Yl , . . . . YN , pk) = f(t, x7 yl ,..., Yr) ’ pk $- hk@, x9 y1 , . . . . Yd (2.9) 
This function is called the k-th Hamiltonian function associated with the game 
(2.5), (2.6), (2.7). 
We shall need the following generalized minimax condition: 
(D). There exist functionsy,*(t, x,p) ,..., yN*(t, x,p), wherep = (p, ,..., p,), 
such that 
(i) the yj*(t, x,p) are measurable in (t, x) ~gr for every p, and 
continuous in p with modulus of continuity independent of (t, x) l &r . 
(ii) for all (t, x) E & and for allp, 
Yj’k x, P) E yi (1 <.i <N); 
(iii) for all (t, x) E& and for all p, 
yI$j;k &(t, x, yl*(t, % p),..., y;c*-&, x, f+ Yk , d+& x9 P>PV YN*@, ‘, Ph pk) 
= ff&, x, Yl*(t, x, p),-3 yN*(6 2, P>, pk) (2.10) 
for 1 < k < N. 
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EXAMPLE. Suppose 
f(t, %Yl ,...! YN) = i F&P % Yk) 
61 
(2.11) 
Then (2.10) is equivalent to 
y~$$~k(t, x Yk) * Pk + hkk@ x, Yk)) = Fk@, x7 Yk*) * Pk + hkk(4 XT Yk*), 
(2.12) 
where y,* = yk*(t, x, p,). By Lemma 1 of [l], yk*(t, X, plc) can be taken to be 
measurable in (t, X) for each p, . If it is also continuous in p, , for each (t, x), 
with modulus of continuity independent of (t, x), then the condition (D) 
holds. 
THEOREM 1. Let (AI)-( (C) and (D) hold. Then there exists a solution 
4* = (+l*,..., #I~*) of the semilinear parabolic system 
ag + f aij(t, x) -TiT!&- axi axj + f (6 3, Y *cc x, V&q) * V.&c i,j=l 
+ h,(t, x, r*(t, x, V,4)> =0 in QT , l<k<N, (2.13) 
+k = gk on r,. (2.14) 
More precisely, 4 is continuous in & and satisfies (2.14), V,4* is a bounded 
function in QT , uniformly Hiilder continuous (with some exponent a) in compact 
subsets of QT , the weak derivatives a24klaxi axj belong to LT(QT) for any r > 1, 
and (2.13) holds almost everywhere. 
We have used here the notation 
Psi4 = (vcc+l Y’..> Vzhl). 
Proof. Fix ,6 E (0, 1). Let {Qn} be a sequence of bounded domains such 
that Q C Qn, ZP E Ca+fl, and a@ converges to a52 in the norm of C2+a, i.e., 
there is a finite number of neighbourhoods containing a@, aQ such that in 
each neighbourhood a@ and aQ can be represented in the form 
xi = h”(x, ,..., xi-1 9 xi+1 ,*a., XnJ, 
xi = h(x, 7***5 xi-l 9 xi+l 3.*-s %n> 
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for the same i, and, as n + 00, 
Set 
h” --f h, D,hn -+ D,h, Dz2hn -+ D,% uniformly. 
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Qm = (s, T) x ~3, r3QTn = {(T, x); x E X@}, 
STn = (s, T) x %I”, rT% = s,n u q? 
Let g” = (gin,..., gNn) be functions in P(p) such that 
II g” - g II;,: - 0 if n+c0. 
Let aL(t, x),f”(t, x, yr ,..., yN), h”(t, x, yr ,..., yN) be continuously differen- 
tiable functions in all their variables, satisfying the conditions (AI)-( 
(C) with vi, v independent of n, such that, as n --f ~r3, 
a: + aij uniformly in QT , 
f% x, Yl >.‘.T YN) -+J(t, x7 Yl >“.Y yN) uniformly in Q, X Y, X *.. X Y, , 
h”(t, x, yt ,..., yN) + h(t, x, yr ,..., yN) uniformly in QT x Y, x *em X Y, . 
LetT(t, x, p) = (91n(t, x, P),..., YA4 x, P)> b e continuously differentiable 
in all their variables such that 
where CO is a constant independent of n, and such that (a) for each p, 
gv, x, P) -+ Y *(4 x, PI for almost all (t, x) E Qr , 
as n -+ 00, and (b) the yj*(t, x, p) are continuous in p, with modulus of 
continuity independent of t, x, n. We can take, for instance, jP to be a mollifier 
of y * with respect to all the variables. 
Consider the semilinear parabolic system 
+ hkn(t, x  P(t, x, V,+>) +bn(t, 4 = 0 in QP, 
+& = gkn on rTm. 
(2.15) 
(2.16) 
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Here, hkn is a continuously differentiable function having the following 
properties: (i) hr”(t, x) = 0 if 
dist((t, x), aJ2rm) > -$ ; 
is independent of n, and (iii) the relation (2.15) 
and their derivatives are computed from (2.16). 
p. 5961, the system (2.15), (2.16) has a unique 
solution 4% = ($r” ,..., 4#). Indeed, notice first that the following a priori 
bound hold: 
1.u.b. j p(t, z)I < M, 
QT" 
(2.17) 
where M is a constant independent of n. This follows by considering $kn as 
a solution of the K-th equation in (2.15) an d using the proof of Theorem 2.9 
in [17, p. 231. 
The unique solution $” of (2.15), (2.16) satisfies (by Lemma 6.1, p. 589 
of V71) 
1.u.b. 1 D,+“(t, x)I < Ml, 
QT" 
(2.18) 
where Ml is a constant independent of n. We can therefore apply Lemma 2 
and conclude that for any set Q’ with closure in Qr , 
I W% ~I,,Q, d Ma, (2.19) 
where Ma is a constant independent of n. 
From Lemma 1 and (2.18) we also get, for any Y > 1, 
(2.20) 
where M3 is a constant independent of n. We can now extract a subsequence 
{p’} of {@} such that, as n’ -+ co, 
4 +* 7%’ 2 weakly in l4$‘(Qr), 
p* + #* uniformly in Qr , 
V,p’ + V,$* uniformly in compact subsets of Qr . 
It follows that, for almost all (t, X) E Qr , 
Yv, x, VdP’(4 4) - r*(t, % v,#*(t, 4) 
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as n’ -+ 00. Hence, for almost all (t, x) E Qr , 
-f(t, 3, Y*(t, x, v&*(4 3)) * vz&c*(t, x) + &!(4 x9 Y”(4 x, v&*(6 x>> 
(2.21) 
as n’ + KI. From the Lebesgue bounded convergence theorem we then 
deduce that (2.21) holds with “+” standing for weak convergence in L2(QT). 
Since also 
weakly in La(Qr), we conclude that $* is a solution of (2.13). Clearly, (2.14) 
also hold. The proof of Theorem 1 is thus complete except for the assertion 
that +* E Wz*l(Qr) for any r > 1. Note that we have constructed $* as a 
weak limit of functions in WF*r(Qr) f or a particular r. Taking a sequence of 
increasing r’s and using the diagonal method, we obtain a solution C* that 
belongs to TV~B~(Q~) for any r. 
We now state the main result of this section. 
THEOREM 2. Let the assumptions (AJ-(Aa), (C) and (D). Write 
yj*tt, 4 = Yj*(t, x, vd*(t, x)1, 
where 4 * is us in the assertion of Theorem 1. Then 
u*ct, x) = (yl*(t, x),..., YN*(t, x>> 
(2.22) 
is un equilibrium point in pure strategies of the differential game associated with 
(2.9, (2.6), (2.7). 
Proof. Let y,(t, X) be any pure strategy for the player yk . Denote by 
4 = ($1 >*a*, $N) the unique solution of 
2 + f uij(t, x) .-!!Yc- 
i&l 
axi axj 
+ f (4 % Yl*(t, x),..., rL(t, 4, Yk(4 4, Y,*,l(4 ~),..v YN*(ts 4) * Vdr 
+ h,(t, x, ~l*(t, x),..., r;t*-&, 4, ylc(t, 4, r;+,(t, x),-v YN*P, 4) = 0 
inQT, (2.23) 
A = g, on rT. (2.24) 
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By (2.10) we find that the function #le* satisfies 
almost everywhere in Qr . Setting 
44 4 = f(t, x9 Yl*k 4,..., Y,*_&, 4, yJc(t, 4, Yk*f& x),..., r‘v*tt, x>>, 
we see that the function x = +lc* - $k satisfies 
+ b(t, x) . V,x > 0 almost everywhere in Q, . 
By Lemma 2 of [l], x < 0 in Qr . This gives (2.8). 
For a zero-sum 2-person game, we can prove Theorem 2 under a condition 
weaker than (D), called the minimax condition: 
(D’). For any (t, x) E Qr and for any p, in RnS, 
min max Hlttj x3 y1 , yz , PA = yyg y$ fAt4 2, y1 , y2 , PJ. 
YlEYl Ya”Y, 
(2.25) 
Note, by Lemma I of [l] that there exist measurable functions 
yr = yl*(t, X, pl), yz = y2*(t, x, pr) with values in Yr and Y2 , respectively, 
such that 
yyEag H,(t, x, yl*(t, x, PI), y2 , Pl) = y”:; yyE$t fu x, y1 ’ J5 ’ l-4 (2-26) 1 
yl$k-$ H,(t, x, y1 , yz”(t, x7 PI), PI) = f$; $? futt x9 y1 ’ yz y PA- (2*27) 1 
From this we infer the condition (2.10). However, we cannot infer, in general, 
that the yj*(t, X, p,) are continuous in p, . 
Set 
w x9 PI = rg yycz fw, % Yl 9 Ya 9 PI. (2.28) 
THEOREM 3. Let N = 2, J2 = -J1 , and assume that (AI)-( (C) and 
(D’) hold. Then there exists a solution +* of the parabolic equation 
g + f a&t, x) -i!eL axi ax5 + H(t, x, V,$) = 0 in QT (2.29) i,j=l 
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with the initial-boundary conditions 
4 =g1 on r,. (2.30) 
More precisely, d, is continuous in QT and satisjes (2.30), V,+* is a bounded 
function in QT , uniformly Holder continuous (with some exponent a) in compact 
subsets of QT , the weak derivatives +*/at, a2+*/axi axj belong to Lr(QT) for any 
Y > 1, and (2.13) holds almost everywhere. 
Since H(t, x, p) is a continuous function in (t, x, p), the proof of Theorem 3 
is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. 
THEOREM 4. Let the conditions of Theorem 3 hold and let yl*(t, x,p), 
y2*(t, x, p) be any measurable functions with values in YI , Yz respectively, 
satisfying (2.26), (2.27). Write 
Yl*(t, x) = Yl*(t, x, v,$*(t, x>>, 
Y2*(t, 4 = Yz*k x, v,$*(t, 4). 
I!Xen (Yl*(4 x),Y2*(4 1) . x 2s a saddle point in pure strategies of the differential 
game associated with (2.6), (2.7) ( w h ere k = 1, N = 2) and the payoff (2.5) 
(with k = 1). 
Proof. Let yr choose the strategy yl*(t, x), and let y2 choose any strategy 
y2(t, x). Denote by 1+5 the solution of 
-$- + 5 aij(t, x) * axi axj + f (4 x, Yl*(t* 4, Y2(4 4) - VdJ i&l 
+ h,(t, x, yl*(t, x), y2(t, x)) = 0 in QT , 4 = gl on rT - 
Since c$* = II, on F, and 
(2.31) 
‘g + f aij(t, x) -!EC axi axj + f (4 x, Yl*(t, 4, Y2(4 4) * v,+* i,j=l 
+ W, x,x*(4 4 ydt, 4) < 0 
almost everywhere in QT , we conclude, by Lemma 2 of [l], that $* > # in 
Q= . This gives 
MYl*9 Y2*) 3 h(Yl*, Y2>. 
Similarly, one proves that 
.MYl*, y2*) G Jl(Y1 9 y2*)* 
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Remark. We have dealt so far with the case where the initial condition 
t(s) is fixed. If t(s) is not fixed, that is, if the random variable x,, = x,,(w) 
is not a constant function of w, then suppose that its distribution is given by 
a measure CL,, defined on J2. The cost z&J s, x0) is then to be replaced by the cost 
The results of this section immediately extend to this more general case. 
3. DIFFERENTIAL GAMES WITH PARTIAL OBSERVATION 
We consider, in this section, a game played by 2 players, y and z. The 
dynamics is given by a system of stochastic differential equations 
d5 = f(t, E, Y, 4 dt + 4 6) dw (3.1) 
with initial point 
5(s) = x0 . (3.2) 
As in Section 2, control sets Y and 2 are given, and they compact subsets 
of some euclidean spaces RP and R’J, respectively. A payoff is given by 
P(Y, 4 = Es, 1 j: 47, E, y, 4 dt + g(~, &))[, (3.3) 
where r is the exit time from QT . The player y wants to maximize the payoff, 
while the player z wants to minimize it. 
If y and x make perfect observations, and if they use only pure strategies, 
then the existence of a saddle point follows by Theorem 4. Suppose now that 
y and x, at time t, can only observe a quantity y(t), and suppose, further, 
that the manner by which rJ(t) is related to t(t) is known to have the form 
4 = f(t, 5, rlt Y, 4 dt + 4 5,~) df4 
where Z is a Brownian motion independent of w. We then consider the pair 
5 = (7, 6) as defining a diR usion process, governed by stochastic differential 
equations. With respect to this system, the players y and z observe a certain 
number of components of 5, namely the components of 7. The above setting 
is thus equivalent (with a different notation) to the following one: 
The dynamics of the game is given by (3.1), and the players y, z observe 
just the first I components 4, ,..., .$r of f = (5, ,..., &). 
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Set 
E = (El ,*--, a, i = (&+I ,“a, L), 
so that 5 = ({, 8). We define a pure strategy for y as a measurable function 
y = y(t, [) from [s, T] x R1 into Y, and a pure strategy for z as a measurable 
function z = .a(t, [) from [s, T] x Rz into 2. 
As in Section 2, under some assumptions on f, u, the payoff (2.3) cor- 
responding to the solution of (3.1) (3.2) with y = y(t, $), .a = (t, $) can be 
given as follows: If 
+ A(4 x, y(t, a)) = 0 in Qr , (3.4) 
# =g on rT, (3.5) 
then 
P(Y, 4 = $4, %I)- (3.6) 
We shall replace the original setting of (3.1)-(3.3) by the setting (3.4)-(3.6). 
We can define saddle point in pure strategies as in Section 2. However, there is 
no simple connection between such saddle points and solutions of equations 
of the Hamilton-Jacobi type. This makes it much more difficult to try to 
prove the existence of a saddle point in pure strategies. There is also an 
intuitive reason why one should not expect, in general, the existence of 
a saddle point in pure strategies: In the lack of perfect observation, each 
player should make use of all the past history of the game, not just the present 
state. 
We shall now develop an existence theory based on the partial observation 
of the whole past. This method is analogous to that introduced in [9]-[12] 
for deterministic games. 
Let n be any positive integer, and let 6 = (T - s)/n. Denote by Ij the 
interval tjel < t < tj , where tj = s + jS. Denote by Yj (Zi) the set of all 
measurable functions yi(t, 9) (zj(t, a)) from Ij x Rm into Y(Z). An upper 
a-strategy P for y is a vector 
rs = p,..., ry, 
where Pj is a map from 
2, x Yl x ..* x zj-1 x Yj-1 x zj 
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into Y, . A lower S-strategy d, for 2 is a vector 
where A,,, is an element of 2, , and A,,j (j > 2) is a map from 
2, x Yl x ... x zj-1 x Yj-1 
into Zj . 
We shall assume 
(C’). f(t, X, y, z) and h(t, x, y, z) are continuous functions in [s, T] x R” x 
Y x 2, ?XJ E C2+n for some cu. E (0, l), and g E Cf*‘(r,). 
Any pair (A, , P) defines a unique pair of pure strategies (y”(t, a), zs(t, a)), 
called the outcome of (A,, P). If (A,), (AJ, and (C’) hold, then there is a 
unique solution 4” of (3.4), (3.5), wheny = y6(t, a), z = xs(t, a), and a payoff 
P(YS> %I = P(s, x0). 
We denote this payoff also by P[A, , P], or 
P[A8,, , PJ ,..., A,,, , l-1. 
The above scheme of corresponding a payoff P(A, , P) to each pair 
(A, , P), is called an upper a-game, and is denoted by G6. The upper &value 
V6 of this upper a-game, is defined by 
Similarly, we define lower S-game G, and lower S-value V, . Here, y uses 
lower a-strategies I’, and z uses upper a-strategies AS. The pair of sequence 
G = (K% Gc4 ( 
a= T--s -, n=‘1,2 )... n 1 
is called the da#erentialgame withpartial observation associated with (3.4)-(3.6). 
If 
v+ = ljy vs, V- = lim Vs 
+ 6-O 
exist, we call them the upper value and the lower value of the game. If 
V+ = V-, then we say that the game has value V, where V = V+ = V-. 
A sequence r = {r,} is called a strategy for y. Similarly, a sequence 
A = {A,} is called a strategy for x. Each pair (A, , F,) determines an outcome 
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(ys , .Q) and the corresponding solution #6 of (3.4), (3.5). Suppose there 
exists a subsequence (6’) of (6) such that, as 6’ ---f 0, 
ys,(t, 2) - r(t, 2) weakly in Ll((s, T); Rp), (3.7) 
z&t, a) - Z(i, a) weakly in Ll((s, T); R*), (3.8) 
A,(4 4 - $(t, 4 for each (t> 4 E QT , (3.9) 
where ~(t, a) E Y, %(t, a) E 2 almost everywhere, and 4 is the solution of (3.4), 
(3.5) corresponding to y = 7, x = 2. Then we say that (7, %), or (7, Z, $), 
is an outcome of (d, r). The set of all numbers r&s, x0), when (7, Z, $) varies 
over the set of all outcomes of (d, F), is called the payoff set of (d, r), and is 
denoted by P[A, T]. 
Given two sets of real numbers, A and B, we write A < B if a < b for 
all a E A, b E B. We write A < B also in case A is empty or B is empty. 
Suppose the value I’ exists, and let A*, r* be strategies such that 
P[A*, T] < P[A*“, T*] = {I/‘} < P[A, T”] 
for all strategies A, r. Then we call (A*, T*) a suddZepoint. 
(3.10) 
We shall denote the payoff $J(s, x0) also by P(#). 
We can extend the concept of an outcome of (A, r) by omitting the 
conditions (3.7), (3.8). Thus, a solution I,& of (3.4), (3.5) (corresponding to 
some y = y(t, a), z = z(t, CC)) is called a generalized outcome of (A, I’) if 
(3.9) holds for some subsequence {S’} of (6). The set of all numbers P($), 
where $ varies over the set of generalized outcomes of (A, r), is called the 
generalizedpuyoffset of (A, r), and is denoted by P,[A, F]. A pair (d *, r*) is 
called a generalized saddle point if it satisfies (3.10) with P replaced by PO. 
The concept of strategy as introduced in [12] differs from that introduced 
here. In [12], the spaces Yj (.Zj) consist of all the measurable functions 
yi(t) (q(t)) from lj into Y(Z). Here they consist of all the measurable functions 
Y&Y 4 (44 4) f rom lj x Rm into Y(z). However, if we introduce in [12] 
the latter spaces (but restrict the y,(t, x), q(t, x) to be uniformly Lipschitz 
continuous in x and requestf(t, X, y, a) to be Lipschitz continuous in (x, y, z), 
so as to have a unique trajectory for each pair of controls), then the resulting 
game will have the same value as in [12] (or [9]). In fact, the proof of the 
formula 
VB = inf sup **- inf sup P(x, , y1 ,..., d, ,yn) 
2,E.z YIEY Z&Z y&Y 
given in [12] extends also to the present case where control functions have 
the form y(t, x), z(t, x). This implies that the concept of the upper value 
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does not change when control functions y(t), z(t) are replaced by control 
functions y(t, x), z(t, x). Similarly, the concept of the lower value does not 
change. 
Next, we can define a concept of strategy (for deterministic games) based 
on controls of the form y(t, x), z(t, x). As far as the existence of a saddle 
point, the max-min principle and the computational methods of [12] are 
concerned, we shall not get anything new. The numerical results in [12] for 
saddle points of particular games will be the same for the saddle points 
based on controlsy(t, x), z(t, x). We can, therefore, conclude that the approach 
of the present section to stochastic games reduces, in fact, to the approach of 
[9]-[12] when the games are deterministic. 
Another remark. To every pure strategy y(t, 9) we can correspond a 
constant strategy I’ as follows (cf. [12]): 
F = if,}, cs = v-&l ,...> LA 
where f6.j maps the whole space Z, x Yr x ... x Zj-r x Yj-, into the 
point pj(t, R), the restriction of $t, 2) to Ij . Using this correspondence, 
we can show that the equilibrium point in pure strategies established in 
Section 2 for a 2-person zero sum game, gives a saddle point in constant 
strategies-in the context of the present section. The concept of strategy as 
defined in this section and the last assertion extend also to N-person games. 
We shall need the following condition: 
(E). The controlsy, .z appear “separately” inf, h, i.e., 
f(C x, y, x) = f’(4 x, Y) +f”(t, x, 4, 
h(t, x,y, 4 = h’(t, 2,~) + Wt, x, 4. 
THEOREM 5. Let the conditions (A1)-(A4), (C’) and (E) hold. Then the 
d$ferential game with partial observation associated with (3.4~(3.6) has value. 
If the condition (E) is not assumed, one can still prove that V+ and V- 
exist. The proof is obtained by combining the methods of [9] or [12, Chap. 21, 
with estimates derived in the subsequent proof. 
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 in [9] (or 
Theorem 2.3.1 in [ 121); the components X, , yi , instead of being functions of t 
only, as in [9, 121, are now functions of (t, i). Thus, all we need to prove is 
the following lemma. 
LEMMA 4. Let the conditions (A1)-(A4), (C’), (E) hold. Let m(t, a), zA(t, 9) 
be pure strategies for y and x, respectively, for each X from a sequence (A,,}, 
X, L 0 if n ,x co. Let .Z,,(t, 2) be a pure strategy for x satisfying ZA(t, 9) = 
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z,(t - A, .G) for s + h < t < T, h E {A,}. Denote by #,, and $,, the solutions of 
(3.4), (3.5) corresponding to yn , zA and yh , I, , respectively. Then, there exists 
a junction u(X), independent of y,, , z,, , such that c&) -+ 0 ijn -+ co and 
(3.11) 
Proof. Denote by U(t, T) (s < t < T < T) the fundamental solution of 
the parabolic operator 
$ + f a&t, x) -?I- 
i,+=l 
axi axi 
corresponding to the boundary condition u = 0 on asZ, (see [8]). Here we 
consider the elliptic part 
A(t) = f 44 X> & 
i,j=l -2 1 
as a linear (unbounded) operator in X = P(Q), for some fixed r > 1; later, 
we shall take T > n. 
We shall denote by /I /I the norm in X. We shall denote norms of bounded 
linear operators in X by j] /I also. 
We may assume that the resolvent of A(t) exists for all h with Re X > 0, for 
otherwise we first perform a transformation 4 + e@#, where /? is a suitable 
constant. But then, by [8], for s < t < u < T, 
(3.12) 
Next, using the identity 
U(t, 0 + A)x - U(t, u)x = U(t, u + A) j-;+A A(()U([, u)x d[ 
for x E D, (see [8, p. 2501) and estimates on U given in [8, Section 41, we 
find that for s < t < u < u + h < T 
II AB(t)[U(t, (J +A> - up, u)]ll Q c 
X0-8 
(u - ty (0 < 0 < p < p’ < 1); 
(3.13) 
here and in what follows, various different constants are denoted by the same 
symbol C. 
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Set $,, = $A - #,, . Then, with&(t) = &,(t, .), 
- [f2(t, x, %,(C 2)) . Y&J -f”(t, 4 %(4 4) . v&h1 
- pyt, x, qt, q - qt, x, 3(t, WI 
ES -B, - B, - B, . (3.14) 
We shall write Bi(t) = Bi(t, .). 
Supposey,(t, a), .zA(t, a), a(t, a), f and h are all continuously differentiable. 
By Lemma 3, Vdh , V,A are then uniformly Hijlder continuous in 0,. 
Hence, by [8], 
-A(t) = jr U(t, +4(u) du+ j: U(t, 4444 du + j: u(t, +4(u) du
= @l + a$ + a, . (3.15) 
We shall estimate the Qi . First, for any 0 < 0 < 1, 
(3.16) 
Since (see [S]) 
II Vd$A(% .)I1 G C/l AB(cJMA(~~ *)ll if g<e<l, (3.17) 
we get 
By Lemma 3, 
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To estimate 4& , write 
CD3 = 
[J‘ 
T 
t+X 
U(t, u)h2(u, ., zA(u - A, .)) da - ,:-” U(t, +?o, a, zA(o, *)) do] 
+r 
w, u)h2(u, .> %(a, ->) da - jlpA u(t> +‘(a, *> 40, 0)) du 
E I1 + I2 - I3 . (3.21) 
We can write 
By (3.13), 
Ii As(44,, It < C jlpA guard).. II Wu + A 0, ~~(0, .))I1 do d G@ 
if0<p<p’<l.Wealsohave, 
II Jv)~l2 II < c44, c(h) -+ 0 if X + 0, 
where e(h) depends on the modulus of continuity of h2(t, x, x) with respect to t. 
Hence, 
Next 
I/ Ae(t)I, (I < c%-e + Cc(h). (3.22) 
Similarly 11 Ae(t)12 I/ < CA-lo. We conclude that 
11 L4ytp3 11 < m-e + G(X) for any 0 < 0 < p < 1. (3.23) 
Next, 
a, = j T U(t, u)lf2(o, x, %(a, a)) * V&u, x> -f2(t> x, zh(u, 4 * V&(u, 41 da 
tI j’ U(t, u>V”( 0,x, xx(u, 9) . V&o, 41 da 
= CDs1 4 - @22. (3.24) 
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As for @aa , we have, by (3.17) 
if 4 < 19 < 1. As for M(t)@,, , it can be estimated in the same manner as 
A@(t)@& . Here we make use of (3.19), (3.20). The inequality we get is 
11 lqtps,, /I < c/we + G(h) + CP. 
We conclude that 
Combining this with (3.23), (3.18) and (3.15) and setting 
h(t) = II ~ew,(r)ll, /l(X) = mm{+), Pe, h”}, 
we get 
(3.26) 
By iteration we find that 
rdt> G P*(4, P”(h) - 0 if A + 0, 
i.e., 
II .@WA(~)!l < P*(h). (3.27) 
In deriving (3.27) we have assumed that y,, , X~ , s,+ ,f and h are continuously 
differentiable. However, the function /3*(h) occurring in (3.27) depends only 
on the constants which enter into the conditions (A1)-(A4) and on bounds and 
moduli of continuity off, h. Hence, by approximatingy, , z, , Z, ,f by smooth 
functions and applying (3.27) to each of the corresponding #,, , we conclude 
that (3.27) holds in general. 
Since (by [g], for instance) 
I Mt, XII < CII 4M4 .>ll if Y > n, +<@<I, 
the assertion of the lemma follows fram (3.27). 
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Our next objective is to prove the existence of a saddle point. We shall need 
the following conditions: 
(F). f(t, X, y, z) and h(t, X, y, z) are linear functions of y, z, i.e., 
f(tt x, Y14 = fYt, x) + F1(t, x)y + Iyt, x)z, 
46 x, y, z) = hO(t, x) + h’(t, x) * y + hZ(t, x) * z, 
and Y, 2 are convex sets. 
(F’). For any (t, X) E Qr and p E R’“, the set 
f(4 x, y, 2) * p + h(4 x, y, -q 
-{(f(t,X,Y,z).P+h(t,x,y,z);YEY,zEZ) 
is a convex set. 
LEMMA 5. Let (AI)- hold. Let f(t, x,y, z) be continuous in [s, T] x 
Rm x Y x 2, al2 E C2+a (for some (Y > 0), g E Ci*‘(I’,), and let (F) hold. 
Then, given any sequence of pure strategies (y,(t, a), zn(t, a)) and the corre- 
sponding solutions I/J, of (3.4), (3.5), th ere exists a subsequence {n’> of {n} and 
pure strategiesy(t, a), .%(t, 2), such that, as n’ + co, 
Y?l ’ - 7 in L’((s, T); Rp), z,,, - z in Ll((s, T); RQ), (3.28) 
&,(t, x) + $(t, x) uniformZy in QT , (3.29) 
where $ is the solution of (3.4), (3.5) corresponding to 7, Z. 
Proof. We may assume that g = 0, for otherwise, we consider I,!I, - 6, 
where $ is a C’z*l extension of g into QT . 
The proof of (3.28) follows by a standard argument (cf. [12, proof of 
Theorem 2.4.11). Since, by Lemma 3, 
I A(4 4 - $k(t’, x’)l + I V&42(4 4 - vcA(t’~ 41 
< C(l t - t’ p/2 + 1 x - x’ la), 
we may also assume, by the Ascoli-Arzela lemma, that 
(3.30) 
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uniformly in QT , where rJ is some function. Writing 
VW, 4 = jr qt, u)[fO(u, x) + FL(u, x)y,(o, a) 
+ F%J, +%(u, a)] - V&,(0, X) du 
and taking n = n’ --f co, we find that 
+ j’ up, u)[hO(u, x) + hl(u, x) * jqu, a) 4 hZ(u, x) * .%(a, Lq] au. 
t 
(3.31) 
The solution of (3.4), (3.5) - - corresponding to y, z satisfies the integral 
Eq. (3.31). Further, from the estimates (3.12), (3.17) we can deduce that there 
is at most one solution of (3.31). It follows that 4 is the solution corre- 
sponding to 9,~ This completes the proof of the lemma. 
The next lemma is analogous to Filippov’s theorem in “Ordinary 
Differential Equations.” 
LEMMA 6. Let (Ai)- hold. Let f(t, x,y, z) be continuous in [s, T] x 
R”” x Y x 2, &f E Czfa (for some 01 > 0), g E Ca*l(I’T), and let (F’) hold. 
Then, given uny sequence of pure strategies (y,(t, x), zn(t, x)) (here I = m) 
and the corresponding solutions & of (3.4), (3.5) (with 4 = x), there exists a 
subsequence In’) of (n} and a solution 4 of (3.4), (3.5) (for some pure strategies 
y(t, x), x(t, x)) such that (3.29) holds. 
Proof. Write U = Y x 2, u, = (ym, z,). As in the proof of Lemma 5 
we may assume thatg = 0 and that (3.30), (3.31) hold with .$ = x. We can 
write 
where 
VW, ,) = jr W, +n(u, -) du> (3.32) 
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We may assume that the subsequence {n’} is such that 
k,,(a, x) - qu, x) in L1(QT), 
k,f(U, .) - &((a, .) in Ll((s, T); Ll(sZ)). 
By arguments used in the proof of Theorem 2.4.2 of [12], we deduce that 
&a, x) Ef(U, x, U) . v&o, x> + h(u, x, U). 
From the proof of Filippov’s lemma (with t replaced by (t, x)) we deduce that 
there exists a control function C(t, X) = ($(t, x), %(t, x)) (with values in 
Y x 2) such that 
&a, x) =f(u, x, qu, x)) . v&u, x) + h(o, x, qu, x)). 
But then, from (3.32), (3.33) we conclude that 
+ s T qt, u)h( u’,x, P’(u, 4, a(~, 4) do. t 
Hence $ is a solution of (3.4), (3.5) corresponding to y = j, z = 1. This 
completes the proof of the lemma. 
Using Lemma 5 we can apply the method of proof of Theorem 2.5.1 in 
[12], and thus deduce the following result concerning the existence of a saddle 
point. 
THEOREM 6. Let the conditions of Theorem 5 hold, let 8~2 E C2+ (for some 
c1 > 0), and let (F) hold. Then there exists a saddle point for the game of partial 
observation associated with (3.4)-(3.6). 
Similarly, using Lemma 6 one can establish the existence of a generalized 
saddle point for the game of perfect observation associated with (3.4)-(3.6) 
(with 2 = x), replacing the condition (F) by the weaker condition (F’). 
However, in Section 2 we have already established a stronger result for games 
of perfect observation, concerning the existence of a saddle point in pure 
strategies. The usefulness of Lemma 6 lies then only in establishing the fact 
that the generalized payoff set P,[d, I’] is never empty. 
Theorems 5 and 6 extend to the case where one player observes xi ,..., xiZ 
and another player observes xj, ,..., xile , for some indices il ,..., i, , i,‘,,.., jk . 
Remark 1. One can show that the value of the game V(s, CC,,) is a continuous 
function of (s, a$. The proof is analogous to the proof of the corresponding 
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result for deterministic games (in [9, 121). One uses here estimates from 
Sections 1 and 3. 
Remark 2. Theorems 5 and 6 and the last remark extend to the case 
where the initial random variable x0 = x0(w) is not the constant function. 
4. STOCHASTIC GAMES WITH DEGENERACY 
If UU* is not positive definite, then the parabolic Eq. (3.4) is degenerate. 
The results of Sections 2 and 3 are based on estimates that have been 
established in the literature for nondegenerate parabolic equations only. 
Therefore at present the results of Sections 2 and 3 cannot be extended to the 
degenerate case. To illustrate the kind of difficulty that is encountered in the 
degenerate case, and also to suggest a possible line of approach, consider the 
following special case: The dynamics is given by 
7i = f-44 rl,y, 4, rl(s) = 70 . (4-l) 
dl = f(t, t, rl, Y, 4 dt + ~0, 5) dw, t(s) = Eo 3 (4.2) 
where au* is positive definite, and 
(4.3) 
~(7) is a continuous functional of 7 in a suitable topology. The control 
functions are either of the formy(t, f, v), z(t, I, q), where a uniform Lipschitz 
condition with respect to 77 is assumed, or of the form y(t, E), z(t, [). For 
simplicity, assume the latter form. 
Solving 77 = ~(y, z) from (4.1) and substituting into (4.2), we obtain 
d5 = f(t, E, rl(y, 4, Y, 4 dt + 46 5) dw, 4(s) = 50 * (4.4) 
Note, however, that this system is not a stochastic differential system of the 
usual type, since ~(y, z) at time t depends on the controls y = y(u, ((a)), 
.a = x(u, E(u)) for all s < u ,< t. Thus (4.4) is, in effect, a stochastic integral 
equation of Volterra type. By the methods of [16] one can establish the 
existence of a solution for (4.4). However, there is no connection, in general, 
between such a system and parabolic equations. Thus, in order to extend 
the results of Sections 2 and 3 to the present degenerate case, one has to 
STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 107 
study stochastic integral equations and relate them, perhaps, to some 
“integro-parabolic” equations. 
For the one player case, the system (4.1), (4.2) represents a slightly more 
specialized case of degeneracy than that treated by Fleming [2]. A solution of 
the optimal problem for the one-player case has been recently obtained by 
Rishel [18]. 
REFERENCES 
1. W. H. FLEMING, Some Markovian optimization problems, I. IMath. Me& 
12 (1963), 131-140. 
2. W. H. FLEMING, Duality and a priori estimates in Markovian optimization 
problems, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 16 (1966), 254-279. 
3. W. H. FLEMING, Optimal control of partially observable diffusions, SlAM J. 
Control 6 (1968), 194-214. 
4. W. H. FLEMING, Optimal continuous-parameter stochastic control, SIAM Review 
11 (1969). 470-509. 
5. W. H. FLEMING AND M. NISIO, On the existence of optimal stochastic control, 
J. Math. Mech. 15 (1966), 777-794. 
6. A. FRIEDMAIV, On quasi-linear parabolic equations of the second order II, J. 
Math. Mech. 9 (1960), 539-558. 
7. A. FRIEDMAN, “Partial Differential Equations of Parabolic Type,” Prentice- 
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1964. 
8. A. FRIEDMAN, “Partial Differential Equations,” Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
New York, 1969. 
9. A. FRIEDMAN, On the definition of differential games and the existence of value 
and saddle points, J. Differential Equations 7 (1970), 69-91. 
10. A. FRIEDMAN, Existence of value and of saddle points for differential games of 
pursuit and evasion, J. Difleerential Equations 7 (1970), 92-l 10. 
11. A. FRIEDMAN, Existence of value and of saddle points for differential games of 
survival, J. Differential Equations 7 (1970), 111-125. 
12. A. FRIEDMAN, “Differential Games,” Interscience, New York, in press. 
13. E. GAGLIARDO, Proprieta di alcune classi di funzioni in pih variabili, Ricerche di 
Mat. 8 (1959), 24-51. 
14. E. GAGLIARDO, Ulteriori proprieta di alcune classi di funzioni in piti variabili, 
Ricerche di Mat. 8 (1959), 24-51. 
15. I. I. GIKHMAN AND A. V. SKOROKHOD, “Introduction to the Theory of Random 
Process,” Saunders, Philadelphia, 1969. 
16. I. I. GIKHMAN AND A. V. SKOROKHOD, “Stochastic Differential Equations,” 
Kiev, 1968. 
17. 0. A. LADYZHENSKAJA, V. A. SOLONNIKOV, AND N. N. URAL’CEVA, “Linear and 
Quasilinear Equations of Parabolic Type,” Translations Amer. Math. Sot. 
Vol. 23, Providence, R. I., 1968. 
18. R. W. RISHEL, Weak solutions of a partial differential equation with dynamic 
programming, SIAM J. Control, to appear. 
19. V. A. SOLONNIKOV, A priori estimates for equations of second order of parabolic 
type, Trudy Mat. Inst. Steklov 10 (1964), 133-212; Amer. Math. Sot. Transl. (2), 
65 (1967), 51-137. 
108 FRIEDMAN 
20. V. A. SOLONNIKOV, On boundary value problems for linear parabolic systems of 
differential equations of general form, Trudy Mat. Inst. Steklow 83 (1965), 3-163. 
21. D. W. STROOCK AND S. R. S. VARADHAN, Diffusion processes with continuous 
coefficients, Comm. Pure Appl. Math. 12 (1969), 345-400, 479-530. 
